OP ED: Golden Dome’s cyber protection must be a design choice, not an afterthought

Jack Wilmer was the Chief Information Security Officer at the Department of War from 2019-2020 and is currently CEO of SIXGEN. Retired Lt. Gen. Charlie Moore served as Deputy Commander of USCYBERCOM from 2020-2022.

Last year, in a crowded conference hall in the Las Vegas desert, teams of caffeine-fueled hackers surrounded by laptops and radio gear attacked and took control of a simulated government satellite. Operators were locked out as participants seized functional control and redirected payload behavior in real time. 

Fortunately, the 2025 hack was a friendly demonstration. But the STARPWN Capture-the-Flag exercise, which was developed with the help of SIXGEN, a developer of advanced and defensive cyber capabilities, showed just how easily space systems can be infiltrated and exploited. If civilians could expose such vulnerabilities, what are U.S. adversaries capable of — and what could it mean for the Golden Dome missile shield? 

Public discussion of Golden Dome has so far focused on hypersonic weapons, drones, cruise missiles, maneuvering reentry vehicles, and space-based sensors. But the threat of cyber operations targeting the space and ground systems has remained mostly unexamined, which could imperil one of the most consequential national defense projects in decades.

A missile-defense architecture can perform flawlessly in testing and still fail in conflict if its infrastructure can be manipulated, degraded, or denied. Golden Dome risks becoming a system that works beautifully in theory but collapses when America needs it most. As such, policymakers and the Golden Dome Program Office must address a fundamental question: What is the best path forward to protect the defensive shield from cyber vulnerabilities?